Sherlock Holmes and the Adventure of the Rational Manager: Organizational reason and its discontents by Kociatkiewicz, Jerzy & Kostera, Monika
Sherlock Holmes and the Adventure of 
the Rational Manager: Organizational 
reason and its discontents
Abstract
Rationality has since long been one of the central been issues in the discourse of management. 
Among the classics voices propagating a reductionist rationalism dominated and there are still many 
contexts where such a view is taken for granted. On the other hand, critics since the times of classics 
have been arguing for a less linear approach to management and management thinking. However, 
little attention has been paid to some of the di! erent dimensions of management rationality, 
such as imagination. " is paper sets out to address this gap in knowledge through presenting a 
narrative study focused on a literary character well known for his rationality, Sherlock Holmes, and 
revealing that this, to many, very epitome of rationality is actually an example of an extended type 
of rationality, including imagination. Following the # ctional protagonist of our study, we consider 
some aspects of its relevance for management thought and practice.
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Introduction
Rationality has been an important issue in the 
discourse of management. Starting with Frederick 
Taylor’s (1911) description of both managers and 
workers as eminently rational beings (albeit not 
realizing their potential to the fullest extent), through 
Kepner and Tregoe’s (1965) explicit invocation of 
the ideal of the rational manager, to contemporary 
attempts at correcting the irrationality of managerial 
practice (e.g. Loughlin, 2002), there is a strong 
tendency to present rationality as the preferred basis for 
organizational practice. On the other hand, critics like 
Gibson Burrell (1997) have highlighted disastrous and 
outright deadly results of linear applied management 
rationality, while others, such as Case and Phillipson 
(2004) have pointed out irrational roots of popular 
management practices. 
Both the enthusiastic and the critical appraisals 
of managerial rationality tend to assume the view, 
rooted in the Cartesian tradition,  that rationality 
consists of the systematic use of reasoning and logical 
deduction (Descartes, 1996). But rationality need 
not be conceived of as one simple phenomenon. It 
may include quite di! erent motifs and directions for 
action (Weber, 1978; Feyerabend, 1987; Habermas, 
1984). While criticisms of rationality have opposed 
it to imagination (Burrell, 1997; Clegg, 2006), little 
attention has been paid to exploring any possible 
linkages between the two and, indeed, to analysing 
dimensions of management rationality beyond the 
limiting concept of linear thinking. To address this gap 
Jerzy Kociatkiewicz and Monika Kostera2
! is copy does not follow journal layout or page numbers. Originally published in Scandinavian Journal of Management
in knowledge we have carried out a study analysing 
narratives juxtaposing the two notions of rationality 
and imagination. We examine the complex construct 
of what we call the extended Holmesian rationality as 
presented in the narratives of Arthur Conan Doyle, 
and compare it to rationality apparent in management 
literature.  " is allows us to foreground the pitfalls of 
ignoring the complexities of the notion of rationality, 
the importance of considering connections between 
rationality and imagination, and to propose the 
extended Holmesian rationality as a relevant concept 
for management thought and practice.
In this paper we embrace the perspective on rationality 
from the organizational sensemaking point of view. 
Our focus is on the actor’s role and we use the 
narrative resources of # ction writing to address it 
(Philips, 1995). We start out by reviewing the ways 
in which rationality has been conceived of in social 
sciences and how it is typically presented in relation 
to management and organizing throughout the years, 
as well as the accounts of di! erent in% uential views 
on rationality and its limitations in organizational 
context. In particular, we point to Karl Weick’s (1979) 
idea of paradoxical rationality: a much desired aim 
albeit only to be found ex post. We then make a case 
for imagination, and through the # ctive character 
of Sherlock Holmes we show how it can be seen as 
part and parcel of rationality. According to Barbara 
Czarniawska (1999) management writers are like 
writers of detective # ction: they deal with similar plots, 
where a seemingly obvious symptom lies at heart of a 
non-obvious  problem to be # gured out and solved. 
Famous # ctive detectives such as Sherlock Holmes 
and management researchers use similar methods and 
often surround themselves with a similar mystique. 
We argue that managers, too, resemble Holmes, not 
in the least because they, too, refrain from revealing 
their real procedures and methods of action but prefer 
to resort to mystifying statements: “elementary” says 
Holmes and then refers to something outrageously 
complicated. Garley (1920) introducing “Elementary 
Time Study” claimed that the rationality of the 
new system was superior as it allowed for less waste 
and more happiness, while Acko! ’s famous saying 
contended that “the only managers that have simple 
problems have simple minds” (see e.g. Triarchy Press, 
2009). Indeed, managers, like Holmes, have problems 
to solve, problems that may sometimes look banal 
on the surface but are non-obvious and linked to a 
number of issues in a number of ways unexpected 
for the uninitiated. After exploring these similarities 
and some di! erences in detail, we come to re% ect 
on possible lessons for managers from Holmes’ 
imaginative rationality, using Bateson’s (1972; 1979) 
ideas of a non-linear ecosystem which embraces 
nature and human culture and which humanity 
needs to respect in order to survive and blossom. 
" is ecosystem cannot be grasped by the means of 
reductionist rationality but demands a way of thinking 
that is at ease with complexity and paradox. 
Pure rationality
For Durkheim (1982), rationality consists of following 
procedures, methods and reasoning logic. " e right 
(scienti# c) set of procedures adopted in a right 
sequence is, according to such a point of view, what 
guarantees rationality. Max Weber (1978) famously 
held a di! erent view identifying many di! erent 
pursuits as rational. In his writings, he distinguishes 
between four di! erent types of rationality. " e # rst, 
Zweckrational, is focused on the aim that one wishes to 
reach, as de# ned by expectations about the behaviour 
others and other things. " e actor makes calculated 
choices in order to reach those aims. " e second 
type, Wertrational, is related to values and beliefs. " e 
motifs for the actor’s choices and actions are rooted in 
value systems which can be of varying strength and 
nature. " e third type is based on emotions, meaning 
that the actor pursues certain outcomes based on his 
or her emotional states. " e last, fourth type, is linked 
to tradition, and implies making choices based on 
training. Weber regarded these types as ideal types, 
not occurring separately in practice, but usually as 
a mixture with some more dominant than others in 
each case. Jurgen Habermas (1984) criticized Weber’s 
typology as decontextualized and proposed his own 
de# nition, rooted in the social perspective. According 
to him, rationality is an outcome of communication, 
and is inherent in the interpersonal communicative 
process as such. Communication has an intrinsic aim 
which is mutual understanding and the capability 
of bringing it about is placing rationality within the 
communicative structure. 
" eorists of management have also long been looking 
for rational rules that managers could follow all the 
way to inevitable success. Frederick Taylor’s (1911) 
notion of scienti# c management took as its starting 
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point the rationality of interest of all the organization’s 
participants, proceeding to propose a scienti# c 
technique which, not unlike ratiocination, could be 
used to solve all the managerial conundrums one 
might conceivably encounter. Fifty years later, Kepner 
and Tregoe (1965) postulated rationality as the explicit 
goal a manager should strive for. " eir project of ! e 
Rational Manager was attractive enough that almost 
# fty years onwards, new editions of what is now ! e 
New Rational Manager (Kepner & Tregoe, 1997) 
and derivative works such as ! e Rational Project 
Manager (Longman & Mullins, 2005) continue to be 
published, and associated training workshops still # nd 
eager audiences. In these writings rationality is seen 
as a uni-dimensional logic, enabling the manager to 
make the best decision. 
Authors embracing the bounded rationality perspective 
suggest that this view is too simpli# ed and that there 
exist, in fact, many kinds of rationality. Research in 
decision making, notably such authors as Herbert 
Simon and James March (Simon & March, 1958; 
March, 1994), showed that managers make decisions 
based on a bounded rationality, not searching for the 
“best possible” outcome but choosing the “satisfactory 
alternative”, even though managers try to make fully 
rational decisions. Michael Cohen, James March, and 
Johan Olsen (1972) proposed the garbage can theory 
of organizational choice which describes a situation 
where decision opportunities resembles irrational 
“garbage cans” from which managers draw random 
elements of decision making. Sometimes solutions 
appear before a problem arises. Nils Brunsson 
(1982; 2007) distinguished between an impossible 
methodological rationality which managers often 
believe in and the more down to earth and realistic 
action rationality which they adopt in real life. He 
claims that there are other more vital dimensions of 
decision making than rationality, such as mobilization 
of action, distribution of responsibility, and, more 
generally, organizational legitimization. " e ideal of 
rationality is thus far from sensible for managerial 
practice: sometimes good managers may act according 
to systematic irrationality.
An additional dimension of rationality, the social one, 
follows Peter Berger and " omas Luckmann (1966), 
claim that rationality (as well as reality) is socially 
constructed. Societies need rationality and regard it 
as a vital concern. As shared meanings are propagated 
through culture, one of the important aspects of culture 
is therefore to provide rationality for its participants, 
as a guiding line and a frame of reference for social 
actors in their everyday interactions. According 
to Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (1983), 
organizations strive for rationality because it gives 
them legitimization, they "constitute a recognized 
area of institutional life" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 
p.148). Barbara Czarniawska-Joerges (1992) added 
that rationality is a crucial product of contemporary 
organizations, contingent with the basic kind of utility 
that the society and its organizations wish to achieve. 
Gustafsson (1994) elaborates that the foremost use of 
rationality is in creating seriousness, a feature strongly 
desired in contemporary organizational settings.
Rational belief and thought are not without their 
paradoxes. While it is possible to imagine a logical 
system which can be conceptualized and thought 
through, there is a limit to what can be rationally 
scrutinized in that way. It always contains a 
contradiction, a point which can be accessed only via 
external arbitrary decision. In other words, there is 
always a set of axioms or assumptions that one must 
adopt and take for granted in order to undertake such 
a rational scrutiny. Claes Gustafsson (1994) likened 
absolute rationality of thought to the philosophical 
stone which many seek but which remains elusive; a 
pursuit that, whatever its merits, can hardly be thought 
of as rational. Furthermore, he argued, if rationality is 
seen as a relationship between thought and reality, it 
becomes an even more elusive and uncertain idea. Not 
even the natural sciences are capable of such an exact 
representation of their object of study, so much less so 
the social sciences and social actors such as managers; 
the exact knowledge about things: what, how and 
where they are, is just not possible.
For contemporary management practice, however, the 
most crucial notion of rationality relates to action, 
not thought, though the two are sometimes linked. 
Rational action is based on a conviction about its 
direct linkage with external reality; by enacting this 
belief one can expect an interaction with reality to 
take place in a meaningful way. As it is the managers’ 
beliefs that are usually prominent in organizational 
discourse, managerial rationality relates primarily to 
the meanings ascribed to managers’ actions. It should 
be noted, though, that talk is also an action, as is 
re% ection.
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 To walk around and think thoughts not related to 
rational action would thus mean irrational behaviour 
of the manager. 
Rationality is thus always tested against the living 
practical reality, quite regardless of its possible 
underlying intellectual asperity and stringency. 
(Gustafsson, 1994, p. 59) 
Finally, there is another important dimension of 
management rationality that authors interested in 
managerial sensemaking are interested in – one 
related to perception. Karl Weick (1979) pointed out 
a paradox – while people tend to perceive rationality 
as something to be aimed at, or created prospectively, 
what indeed happens is that processes of organizing 
as rationalized ex post. For the ideals of management 
this means that while rationality is one of the crucial 
issues and perhaps even a central focal point of the 
managerial role it is by its very nature quite elusive 
and paradoxical. " e manager needs to work towards 
an aim of rationality, he or she needs to hold on to 
rational standards and aims but it is only ex post 
that he or she is able to know how and if indeed the 
actions undertaken were rational. Weick (1979, p. 5) 
distilled this approach into the general sensemaking 
recipe, “how can I know what I think until I see what 
I say?” Taylor’s scienti# c management as a methodical 
problem solving approach and, later, academic 
science, can thus be better framed as a promise of 
rationality, a systematic approach to the complex 
and often paradoxical practice that would enable a 
straight, planned and fully controllable order (Jacques, 
1996). In Roy Jacques’ narrative of the emergence 
of modern ideas of organization, the managers 
themselves were a consequence of the business order 
of the industrial era and the “remapping of authority 
from occupations to organizations, from foremen and 
owners to ‘management’” (ibid., p. 148). From this 
order followed a kind of knowledge, where common 
sense was replaced by rational concepts of e+  ciency 
and productivity. It was “a numeric, not a sensory, 
domain” (ibid., p. 148). " e ideals of rationality 
directed attention away from practices and towards 
the web of perceptions.
Rationality and imagination? 
 While rationality has been consistently foregrounded 
in studies of management and organizing, another 
very signi# cant factor has also received considerable 
attention in social science, if not always in management 
studies: that of imagination.  Already Immanuel Kant 
(2008) considered imagination as a vital (albeit blind 
and thus presumably not rational) function of the 
mind. Adam Smith (1799) appreciated the importance 
of imagination in philosophy and in the social sciences 
C. Wright Mills (2000) famously depicted the value 
of imagination as quite central. According to him, 
sociological imagination is the ability to connect 
individual experiences to an understanding of one’s 
place in social structure and history. Imagination 
helps to transcend the limitations that make the 
individual a pawn in the play of structures and trends, 
as it enables and understanding of the relationships 
between di! erent perspectives and levels , such as the 
individual and the societal. It creates a bridge between 
the everyday life and the greater historical dimension. 
" e imaginative person can achieve a distanced view of 
his or her life within a much broader context and may 
act upon this vision, thus also practically transcending 
the limitations that would otherwise have de# ned his 
or her fate. Mills (2000) understood imagination as 
a state of mind, an awareness and a striving to make 
sense of what comes one’s way. To develop sociological 
imagination, one should pose oneself three kinds 
of questions: regarding social structure, the place of 
society in history and the role of individuals in that 
society. " us imagination can be seen as the ability 
to link di! erent phenomena, levels of perception and 
abstraction: aspects usually not regarded as logically 
linkable. 
Gareth Morgan (1993) considered imagination 
crucial for the way people manage and deal with 
organizations, as participants or more generally, 
stakeholders. He de# ned imagination as the ability to 
transcend the mundane and stereotypical, in mind as 
well as in action and distinguishes between theoretical 
and practical imagination, for re% ection and for 
action. Both are important in and for organizations. 
Imagination can and should be developed, for example 
through mind-games or the testing of unusual ideas, 
but perhaps most importantly, trough metaphorical 
thinking. Metaphor is an “attempt to understand one 
element of experience in terms of another” (Morgan, 
1986, p. 13) and consists of making links between two 
things based on di! erence and similarity. Metaphorical 
thinking is an ability to conceive of one thing in terms 
of another – or to make unusual connections. For 
contemporary organizations this ability is perhaps 
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more important than ever before – as these change so 
rapidly and so much depends on our capability to face 
and to proactively embrace change, Morgan (1993) 
argued. We agree with this view and we also believe 
that imagination is needed in all managerial and 
organizational practices, among them those calling for 
rationality.
Signi# cantly for our argument in this paper, 
imagination has often been opposed to rationality, 
or presented as incompatible with it. Stewart Clegg 
(2006) de# ned imagination as the “capacity to 
conceive a di! erence” (p. 849) and regarded it as one 
of three bounds of rationality (the two others being 
history and power). He viewed rationality as a linear 
process, all-encompassing in its knowledge claims but, 
in practice, limited by the existence of uncontrollable 
phenomena the interpretation of which  depends 
on sensemaking processes and context. In line with 
Feyerabend’s (1987) discussion of Reason (capital R) 
as a reductive, limiting form of a much more palatable 
and inclusive notion of reason (and, thus, rationality), 
and Denny’s (1991) assertion that Western rationality 
is but one among the many available possibilities,we 
do not share Clegg’s limiting view of rationality. " us, 
while we hold a similar view on imagination, we do 
not see the two as necessarily opposed.
In describing imagination (and the imaginary) in 
literary discourse, Tzvetan Todorov (1975) celebrated 
the moment of vacillation between rational and 
imaginational explanations of observed (or read 
about) phenomena, holding it up as the foundation of 
the literature of the fantastic. In our paper imagination 
is the ability to make unusual connections between 
people, things, perspectives and experiences, and 
it % ourishes through the embracing of the sense of 
wonder or through being in touch with inspiration. 
Fiction, the detective novel and the 
study of organization
Study of imagination required choosing a 
methodological approach that would enable us to 
capture its multifaceted richness. Narrative studies o! er 
such a possibility and, indeed narratives are nowadays 
increasingly recognized as method and substance of 
research in social sciences and management studies 
(Boje, 2001; Czarniawska, 2004). Enacted narrative is 
the most common form of social life, communication 
and sensemaking (MacIntyre, 1981). Experience 
invariably takes narrative form, if the narrative is 
regarded as temporal embedding in the sense that 
Kenneth Gergen (1997) used the term. Yiannis 
Gabriel (2000) advocated using the term narrative 
much more narrowly, as needing a clearly delineated 
plot. He pointed to the usefulness of stories that exist 
spontaneously in organizations. Barbara Czarniawska-
Joerges (1995) was among the # rst to advocate stronger 
links between management writing and narration. 
She saw merit in a more widespread use of narrative 
knowledge in social sciences and humanities, and 
particularly, in organization studies. " e traditions 
of the discipline are connected to narratives, such 
as case studies, studies of organizational stories and 
various interpretative approaches. Scienti# c ethos 
(good scienti" c writing is true writing) can thus be 
abandoned, and we can embrace ideals of beauty 
and use. Representation from relational truth comes 
to mean political representation: "" eories do not 
'represent' reality; theoreticians take upon themselves 
to represent other people and even nature" (ibid., 
p. 27). " ere is a need for a conscious and re% ective 
creation of a speci# c genre, which recognizes tradition 
without being paralyzed by it, which seeks inspiration 
in other genres without imitating them, which derives 
con# dence from the importance of its topic and from 
its own growing skills (ibid.). Elsewhere, Czarniawska 
(1997) explored the links and relationships between 
the elements of two what she sees as genres: # ction and 
scienti# c realism. She maintained that organization 
science has much to gain from a conscious blurring 
of genres, especially in times when boundaries are 
being questioned. Authors should explore how the 
boundaries are being constructed rather than taking 
them for granted. 
Writing management can be seen a genre of writing, 
and as such there is lots to learn from the masters: the 
novelists, poets and dramatists (Czarniawska, 1999b). 
Fiction as a way to tell stories about organizing has 
a great potential. Karin Knorr Cetina (1994) argued 
for introducing # ction into social sciences. Fiction 
can explain and illustrate things that we want to put 
forward as theories. Pierre Guillet de Monthoux and 
Barbara Czarniawska-Joerges (1994) wrote of the 
value of studying literature for management learning 
and for the enhancement of our understanding of 
organizations and organizing. " e book edited by 
them and containing a collection of stories about 
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known literary works and the lessons for management 
that can be learned from them is not only a great read, 
but a really useful book in the teaching process. Nelson 
Philips (1995) claimed that # ction and fact literature 
tend to become one: „the barriers between # ction and 
fact, and art and science, have become increasingly 
di+  cult to defend” (p. 626). Furthermore, „social 
scientists often do what writers do: they create rather 
than discover, they focus on the unique and individual, 
they use illustration and rhetoric in an e! ort to make 
their case” (p. 626). Writers, on the other hand, often 
do what scientists are supposed to do. " e boundaries 
become indistinct and the demolition of them could, 
if not „move us closer to the ultimate truth”, create 
an interesting space for organization studies. Philips 
then goes on explaining di! erent narrative praxes 
and categories, and their use (and possible use) in the 
studies of organization. 
One of the genres that can with advantage be used 
to explore ideas about organization and management 
is the detective story (Czarniawska, 1999a). " e 
protagonist of such a story must disentangle a puzzling 
social context, not unlike the social researcher. " ey 
both take interest in the social and both are dedicated 
to problem-solving. 
" e narratives are constructed in a similar way: 
there is something amiss, it is neither clear nor 
obvious what it is (there are many false clues), this 
“something” must be explained (the problem must 
be diagnosed) and – although this is optional in both 
detective story and in organization studies – the 
way of solving the problem ought to be prescribed. 
(ibid., p. 19)
" e plot of the detective story is similar to that of the 
text about organization, according to Czarniawska 
(ibid.) - they both have two parallel stories, one 
hidden and one explicit. " e tale of the crime and/or 
the problem is the hidden one, and it is unravelled and 
brought to light by the second tale of the investigation. 
" e way that knowledge is acquired is following a 
strict method, but can be di+  cult to grasp for the 
reader. In the detective story, this is, by the way, the 
point. Nonetheless, he or she must be able to see at 
the end of the tale how the detective – as well as the 
researcher – methodically and in a rational way solves 
the problem at hand. Sometimes a third story is used 
to throw light on the second:
A naïve observer, like Dr. Watson in Sherlock 
Holmes, who can indulge in stating the obvious 
since he has a professional status to save him from a 
suspicion of lack of intelligence, or a researcher who 
tells the story of investigations made by a true hero – 
usually a Leader. " e researcher becomes thus a Dr. 
Watson who is protected by the scienti# c method, 
and who can safely be in awe of Sherlock Holmes – 
the practitioner. (ibid., p. 20)
Furthermore, both social science and the detective 
novel o! er insights about the commonplace, the 
everyday life of people described in detail against 
the interruption of an exceptional event (murder or 
research problem). For both, this interruption allows 
the author to reveal the structure of the context which 
usually may be not obvious or not visible to the 
observer. " ey adopt “logics of discovery” which can 
take di! erent shapes, such as deduction, induction, 
and abduction, but always need to involve both 
rationality and suspense. 
From Czarniawska’s writings we retain the notion 
of the similarities between organizational tales and 
detective stories. But instead of positing the researcher 
as a detective, we would like to point to the similarities 
between the latter, and the manager. Malcolm 
Goodman (2000) made a step in that direction by 
imagining Sherlock Holmes (who is also the protagonist 
of our story) as a management consultant, brought 
in to discover the culprits behind organizational 
problems. Gerardo Patriotta (2003) showed the 
usefulness of framing organizational problem-solving 
as a detective story, focused on # nding, performing 
and # nally explaining the problem for the bene# t of 
the audience. He did not name managers as necessarily 
the protagonists of these stories, but other authors such 
as O’Loughlin and McFadzean (1999) or Van Bruggen 
and Wierenga (2001) placed problem-solving at the 
heart of manager’s role. We also need to point out that 
Sherlock Holmes appears particularly suitable for this 
substitution because, as Knight (2004) pointed out, so 
many of his cases were already dealing with issues of 
lost, stolen, or endangered property.
Before we turn to the Great Detective himself and more 
parallels between his practice and that of management, 
we need to sketch out the history of the genre before 
his appearance. " at said, establishing de# nite 
points of origin for any literary genre is an invariably 
futile and somewhat pointless exercise, and roots of 
the detective story can be and have been traced to 
Gaboriau’s (1977) mid-nineteenth century policeman 
protagonists, Walpole’s princes of Serendip (Merton 
& Barber, 2006; # rst mentioned in 1754) or Voltaire’s 
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(1961) Zadig, # rst published in 1747. For the purposes 
of this paper, the forerunner, or perhaps even the # rst 
practitioner of the modern detective story, Edgar Allan 
Poe, is of particular interest. " e hero of his three short 
stories, Monsieur C. Auguste Dupin, not only solved 
seemingly impossible mysteries, but did so through a 
thoroughly methodical process (castigating, as would 
also be the habit of later detectives, those who did 
not favour a similarly structured approach). It is thus 
not surprising that Poe chose the word ratiocination 
to describe Dupin’s inquiries. And indeed, the results 
were often truly spectacular: in Murders in the Rue 
Morgue (Poe, 1982), Dupin is shown to be able 
to decipher thought processes of the stunned and 
admiring narrator simply by looking at the minute 
physical symptoms each thought brought about.
However, neither the history of the genre nor the 
perceptive Monsieur Dupin form the focus of this 
paper. As already stated, our attention is # xed squarely 
on the central # gures of our chosen narratives: the 
eponymous hero of Arthur Conan Doyle’s detective 
stories and the manager of contemporary discourse.
! e rational detective and his 
managerial credentials
Sherlock Holmes, consulting detective is the supremely 
rational character who has been described as having 
“expanded the de" nition of rationality beyond a narrow, 
means-ends instrumentalism to include the imagination” 
(Saler, 2003, p. 604, our emphasis). " e protagonist 
of 56 short stories and 4 novels by Conan Doyle as 
well as numerous pastiches and derivative works by 
other authors, Sherlock Holmes is an immensely 
popular # gure, and also the protagonist presented 
by Czarniawska (1999a) as the model detective-
researcher. 
Holmes routinely astounds the reader by his ability 
to discern the truth by careful examination of 
the seemingly innocuous details and principled 
analysis of the available data. " e world he inhabits 
appears ba=  ing and incomprehensible to most of its 
inhabitants, but thoroughly rational and eminently 
explicable to a skilled observer and thinker. As the 
detective himself notes, “When you have eliminated the 
impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, 
must be the truth” (Doyle, 1981, p. 111). His method, 
the investigative approach he describes as (the science 
of ) deduction, is intimately tied to the popularity 
of the character. Shepherd (1985, p. 20) went as far 
as to describe the detective as “the representation of 
a method embedded in a myth.” Other authors, not 
satis# ed with the mythical status of the Holmesian 
approach, attempted to tease out its principles or trace 
its predecessors and inspirations. " us, numerous 
contributors to Eco and Sebeok’s (1983) ! e Sign of 
! ree argued that the process should be more properly 
termed abduction, following Peirce’s (1955) typology 
of the forms of reasoning, while Ginzburg (1983) 
pointed to an Italian art scholar Morelli and Doyle 
himself (1924) to his medical mentor Joseph Bell as 
Holmes’ real-life intellectual prototype. It might thus 
turn out useful to note some of the intricacies of both 
the character and his inquiries, as well as to compare it 
to those of our other hero, the manager.
One of the most striking features of the detective is his 
single-minded dedication to the solving of criminal 
cases. Upon getting to know Holmes, Doctor Watson 
is simultaneously astonished by the power of Holmes’ 
deductive method and shocked by the vast areas of 
the detective’s ignorance and helpfully delineates the 
extent and limits of his friend’s knowledge for the 
reader’s bene# t:
1. Knowledge of Literature.—Nil.
2. Philosophy.—Nil.
3. Astronomy.—Nil.
4. Politics.—Feeble.
5. Botany.—Variable. Well up in belladonna, 
opium, and poisons generally. Knows nothing of 
practical gardening.
6. Geology.—Practical, but limited. Tells at a 
glance di! erent soils from each other. After walks 
has shown me splashes upon his trousers, and told 
me by their colour and consistence in what part of 
London he had received them.
7. Chemistry.—Profound.
8. Anatomy.—Accurate, but unsystematic.
9. Sensational Literature.—Immense. He 
appears to know every detail of every horror 
perpetrated in the century.
10. Plays the violin well.
11. Is an expert singlestick player, boxer, and 
swordsman.
12. Has a good practical knowledge of British 
law. (Doyle, 1981: 21-22)
" is curious amalgam quite unlike the mix of 
knowledge expected in a Victorian gentleman of 
Holmes’ standing, but the detective steadfastly refused 
to learn anything he did not consider useful. “He said 
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that he would acquire no knowledge which did not 
bear upon his object. " erefore all the knowledge 
which he possessed was such as would be useful to 
him” (ibid., p. 37). Moreover, he considered an excess 
of useless knowledge not just as a distraction, but as 
a positive threat to his investigative abilities, as he 
explained to his ba=  ed friend:
I consider that a man’s brain originally is like a little 
empty attic, and you have to stock it with such 
furniture as you choose.... Now the skilful workman 
is very careful indeed as to what he takes into his 
brain-attic. He will have nothing but the tools 
which may help him in doing his work, but of these 
he has a large assortment, and all in the most perfect 
order (ibid., p. 21). 
" e approach is clearly relentlessly reductionist, and 
relies on the ability of delineating a priori the extent 
of knowledge useful for criminal investigations. " is 
brings out parallels to management and organization 
theory where reductionism has long been the 
dominant stance. Yehouda Shenhav (2000) traced the 
roots of management as a distinct profession and body 
of knowledge in engineering journals at the turn of 
the 20th century, showing the profound in% uence of 
narrowly rationalist mechanical concepts in shaping 
what came to be known as management knowledge. 
Gibson Burrell (1997) argued that these in% uences 
are still prevalent in the # eld of management theory, 
cautioning that “linearity kills,” i.e. that reductionist 
frameworks can and do bring about deleterious, and 
sometimes deadly, consequences. And while the term 
reductionism usually carries pejorative connotations 
(and is thus virtually absent from self-descriptions), 
Dmitry Vostokov (2010) called up the very notion 
of a reductionist manager to present the lessons he 
believes software design theory and practice can bring 
to understanding managerial problems.
Holmes’ fear of cluttering his brilliant mind with 
useless knowledge, and managerial insistence on 
# nding the actual cause of a problem among its 
many apparent constituents both point to the same 
understanding: the methods used can be relatively 
straightforward but real skill (or even genius) lies in 
their correct application. Holmes routinely dismisses 
his extraordinary feats of (what he terms) deduction as 
“absurdly simple” (Doyle, 1981, p. 511) or “simplicity 
itself ” (p. 91), noting that “it is not really di+  cult to 
construct a series of inferences, each dependent upon 
its predecessor and each simple in itself.” At the same 
time, Sherlock’s brother, the equally astute Mycroft 
Holmes, is the only person in Doyle’s stories able to 
match the detective’s deductive powers. 
In the # eld of management, Delbridge, Gratton, and 
Johnson (2006) argued that although there is a large 
number of professional managers, only the exceptional 
ones, who manage to master the di+  cult skills of 
good management, are able to make a di! erence in 
their organizations. " ese skills, much like Holmes’ 
methods, appear deceptively simple:
Many of the insights about ‘best practice’ may at 
# rst sight appear obvious. However, we have found 
that in reality there are many pitfalls in the path of 
managers seeking to import advanced new practices 
into their business (Delbridge et al., 2006, p. 138).
Observation is an important component in both 
detection and management. Holmes castigates Watson 
that he sees but does not observe, while a contemporary 
successful human resource manager gives his readers 
the following advice for learning about an unfamiliar 
organization:
It is useful to pay attention to literally everything: 
the building, information given in the reception, the 
way employees’ dress. " is way we can learn much 
about organizational culture, the way employees 
are treated, and the # rm’s trustworthiness. When 
in the corridor we pass employees who pay us no 
attention, loudly comment on their work or do not 
talk to each other at all, we can presume that the 
environment there is not the best. (Wisniewski, 
2011, np).
Such close observation can enable quick and precise 
assessment of people and situations. Holmes easily 
# gures out people’s profession, personal history, and 
character traits of the people he meets, and another 
successful manager from the same article describes his 
own astounding feat of inference:
" e meeting with the CEO was postponed for a few 
hours. I thought that if it was the norm to force a 
candidate for a key post to wait for an interview, it 
might also turn out to be the norm that the CEO 
believed the market would wait for him to improve 
his products. I was not let down by my intuition – 
today this company is doing decidedly worse than 
ten years ago and was taken over in order to save its 
liquidity (Wisniewski, 2011, np).
At the same time, it should be noted that such 
accomplishments rarely form the centrepiece of a 
story, detective or managerial. " ey establish the 
character’s mastery, but do not provide a template that 
ordinary mortals such as the readers of crime stories 
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or management literature, can ever hope to emulate. 
Following an established structure, 
many of the [Holmes] stories begin with this 
interpretative magic as Holmes decodes a hat, a 
watch, a stick, even just the appearance or clothing 
of a visitor. " ese sequences create a famous brand 
image but it is striking that, as with Dupin, they 
never in fact reveal the mystery of the story: they are 
only detective % ourishes, used for characterization 
and aura alone (Knight, 2004, p. 56).
" e process followed by the detective in solving the 
actual crime described is invariably more mundane 
and straightforward, o! ering signposts along the way 
and relying on direct evidence, be it material or verbal. 
Management manuals such as Kim and Mauborgne’s 
(2005) guide for choosing winning market strategies 
tend to follow a similar format. " e book opens with 
the story of Cirque de Soleil, a successful performance 
group combining theatre and circus. " is serves as 
a comprehensive illustration of the power of value 
innovation, the key concept of the authors’. In 
subsequent explanations of how to de# ne hitherto 
unknown market the authors provide a number of 
examples, but the stunning success of Cirque de Soleil 
is never sullied by such a mundane explanation, nor is 
it particularly useful in charting a path for would be 
value innovators to follow. It remains aloof as proof of 
brilliance of the concept, much like the introductory 
show of detective’s ability.
But the strongly reductionist position outlined above 
does not present a complete picture of Sherlock 
Holmes or his investigations. " e detective sees himself 
as committed to the pursuit of wisdom. He equates 
the latter with the ability to draw correct inferences 
from scarce data, and with making imaginative 
links: in ! e Hound of the Baskervilles, he describes 
his own approach as involving “the scienti# c use of 
imagination” (Doyle, 1981, p. 687). When he fails to 
reach that ideal, the detective berates himself, seeing 
even a delay in reaching the correct conclusion as a 
partial failure: “I confess that I have been as blind as a 
mole, but it is better to learn wisdom late than never 
to learn it at all” (ibid., p. 342). 
Similarly, the gaps in Holmes’ learning noted above 
became much less evident in later stories and, indeed, 
the detective has been shown to exhibit a range of 
interests with few obvious links to criminal detection, 
ranging from beekeeping to opera. Possibly, this 
re% ected the experience of variety in encountered 
criminal cases, or a broader commitment to seeking 
wisdom; the issue is not explicitly raised in any of the 
subsequent narratives, so the point must necessarily 
remain just a conjecture.
" e note of uncertainty echoes the hesitation 
regarding mainstream management literature’s 
approach to managerial knowledge. While most of 
the  textbooks and handbooks we have seen, in line 
with the original approach of Frederick Taylor (1911), 
stressed only the very narrow technical knowledge 
as necessary or important for manager’s work, some 
of the management classics, such as notably Chester 
Barnard advocated a more intuitive and imaginative 
approach to management than did most of his 
contemporaries (Novicevic, Hench, & Wren, 2002). 
Slightly more recently, another well known mainstream 
management giant, Joseph Litterer (1970), claimed 
that a more general education was necessary for future 
management, including both exact sciences and 
humanistic knowledge. 
Rationality rendered un-linear
Regardless of how one should describe his methods, 
Holmes’ success is an undeniable feature of most of his 
stories (even as Watson mentions a number of failures 
among the detective’s cases). " e astounding success 
rate owes much to Holmes’ brilliance, yet it is also the 
result of the determinacy of the world that surrounds 
him: reality turns out to be legible to a discerning 
enough mind. But that is not enough to keep the great 
detective going—instead, his successes are interspersed 
by regular bouts of lethargic depression.
" e outbursts of passionate energy when he 
performed the remarkable feats with which his name 
is associated were followed by reactions of lethargy 
during which he would lie about with his violin and 
his books, hardly moving save from the sofa to the 
table. (Doyle, 1981, p. 386)
Also, Holmes’ rational method is not as linear as it seems 
at a # rst glance. " is trait of Holmes’ is a signi# cant 
characteristic, central to the character and intricately 
bound with his method and outlook on the world; for 
it is the very transparency of the surrounding world 
we have just noted that causes Holmes the greatest 
discomfort. Devoid of the intellectual challenge of an 
unsolved case, he invariably descends into melancholy, 
depression, and drug abuse. Only the promise of 
inexplicability o! ered by a fresh mystery can keep him 
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from the cycle of self-destruction. 
"My mind," he said, "rebels at stagnation. Give me 
problems, give me work, give me the most abstruse 
cryptogram or the most intricate analysis, and I 
am in my own proper atmosphere. I can dispense 
then with arti# cial stimulants. But I abhor the dull 
routine of existence. I crave for mental exaltation. 
" at is why I have chosen my own particular 
profession, or rather created it, for I am the only 
one in the world." (ibid., p. 89-90)
Holmes comes alive through unsolved mysteries, 
needing them to relieve the tedium of existence. 
" e promise of an unsolved case (or perhaps even of 
an insoluble case) is what caused him to become a 
consulting detective, and each solution he arrives at 
sends him back to the bleakness of a comprehensible 
world. Upon completion of one successful case, 
he explained why he was willing to partake in the 
investigation that o! ered little hope of a material 
reward, and his disappointment at the unravelling of 
this diversion:
“It saved me from ennui,” he answered, yawning. 
“Alas! I already feel it closing in upon me. My 
life is spent in one long e! ort to escape from the 
commonplaces of existence. " ese little problems 
help me to do so.” (ibid., p. 190)
Our own world rarely turns out to be as fully explicable 
as that of the great detective. While many managers 
have been, and indeed, still are, seeking for an ideal, 
perfect rationality of decisions, it is not a practically 
reachable aim, which an abundance of empirical 
research shows, beginning with the already mentioned 
studies of Herbert Simon and James March (Simon 
& March, 1958; March, 1994; Cohen et al., 1972). 
Time and many other practical factors turn managers’ 
work into a much more intuitive pursuit than what 
has been proposed by Taylorists, indeed making 
prolonged decision making processes, aimed at perfect 
rationality – irrational from a practical point of view 
(Brunsson, 1982; 2007).
Much as the managerial rationality can be shown 
to be the creation, if not the fevered dream, of 
managerial theorists, so the distressing explicability 
of Sherlock Holmes’ world can also be traced back to 
the detective himself. After all, we have already noted 
that he consciously chooses to limit his understanding 
in order to hone his detective skill, mirroring Paul 
Feyerabend’s (1999) appraisal of the Western science, 
limiting the abundance of our surrounding world in 
order to promote its narrow goals.
" ere are a number of facets to this process of self-
limitation, and as we believe they are illustrative of 
corresponding processes in management theory, we 
would like to try and enumerate them. Firstly, we have 
already discussed how Holmes restricts his knowledge 
to the issues he deems relevant to his pursuits. 
Secondly, the detective limits his observation only to 
the aspects he deems relevant to the investigation. " is 
is not immediately obvious, as the details the detective 
deems important might not strike the casual observer 
(or reader) as immediately identi# able as notable, 
thus leaving the impression that Holmes insists on 
accounting for every minute detail uncovered in his 
investigations. " is is not the case; at one point he 
cautions Watson on what he believes is the proper 
way of presenting the encountered data, clearly 
highlighting the active role of the viewer as the active 
editor of reality (cf. Berger, 1980):
Some facts should be suppressed, or, at least, a just 
sense of proportion should be observed in treating 
them. " e only point in the case which deserved 
mention was the curious analytical reasoning from 
e! ects to causes, by which I succeeded in unravelling 
it. (Doyle, 1981, p. 90)
" irdly, and perhaps the most importantly, the very 
choice of crime detection limits Sherlock Holmes to 
perceiving, and thus unravelling, only a particular 
(and not necessarily the most complex) strain of 
mystery. When in one of his black moods he craved 
for anything of interest,
by anything of interest, Holmes meant anything 
of criminal interest. " ere was the news of a 
revolution, of a possible war, and of an impending 
change of government; but these did not come 
within the horizon of my companion. I could see 
nothing recorded in the shape of crime which was 
not commonplace and futile. Holmes groaned and 
resumed his restless meanderings (Doyle, 1981, p. 
913).
" ere is little reason to presume that criminal cases 
are particularly challenging to demystify. After all, 
Sherlock Holmes’ equally astute civil servant brother, 
Mycroft, appears to # nd su+  cient mental stimulation 
in dealing with the apparently non-criminal 
complexities of public governance. Indeed, as he has 
never been shown to su! er from the mood swings or 
depression plaguing Sherlock, it might be that the 
more world of socio-political relations managed to 
provide su+  cient complexity to keep ennui at bay. 
On the other hand, Mycroft’s obesity might be a sign 
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that some psychological problems plagued the older 
brother as well.
It is possible, then, that the world inhabited by 
Sherlock Holmes was explicable and rational only 
insofar as the detective chose to observe it as such. 
" at choice, while allowing for the showcasing of 
great analytical skill, simultaneously encased Holmes 
in the unbearable setting unable to o! er su+  cient 
intellectual challenge to stimulate the genius mind. 
" is description echoes Freud’s (2002) notion of the 
unbearability of subjugation of the human psyche to 
the mores of the rational society (and while we have 
not encountered this particular comparison, parallels 
between Freud and Holmes have indeed been drawn 
by Shepherd, 1985 and Ginzburg, 1983), casting 
humans as the architects of their own su! ering. " is 
interpretation is further corroborated by two much 
more recent Holmes pastiches, both probing the 
limits of not just the detective’s rationality but also, 
ultimately, his sanity.
Nicholas Meyer’s (1985) ! e Seven Percent Solution 
(later # lmed under the same title), postulates a nervous 
breakdown on part of the detective, brought about 
by the cumulative strain of overwork and cocaine 
addiction. " is culminates in a rising obsession with 
the otherwise innocent mathematics teacher, professor 
Moriarty, and leads to long recuperation overseen 
by none other than Sigmund Freud (covered up by 
spurious stories concocted by Watson to disguise the 
detective’s absence). Jeremy Paul’s (1996) play ! e 
Secret of Sherlock Holmes suggests Moriarty as the 
detective’s alter-ego, accusing Holmes of perpetrating 
the very crimes he later sought to uncover.
" e resulting picture appears rather bleak, with 
Holmes as the creator of the insu! erable rational 
world, and managers compelled to at last declare a 
belief in the impossible and perhaps harmful ideal of 
rationality. 
" e lecture of detective, and indeed, managerial 
narratives allows us, however, yet another position we 
can consider, as neither Holmes’ narrow focus nor his 
horror of complete knowledge necessarily mirror the 
experience of the reader. Kissane and Kissane (1963, p. 
360) describe one of the novels featuring the detective, 
! e Hound of the Baskervilles, as a ritual of reason, 
“the comforting drama of reason asserting its power 
in a natural world to which it is perfectly attuned.” 
" is is what Barbara Czarniawska and Carl Rhodes 
(2006) term a strong plot, an idea from popular 
culture which, through its popularity and persuasive 
power is able to in% uence social practice, including 
management practice. We strongly agree with that 
observation, although in our opinion the word plot 
needlessly prioritizes narrative structure rather than 
ideas embedded in the text. But this reading is not the 
only one available for the story: Pierre Bayard (2008), 
considering only the evidence already provided in 
Arthur Conan Doyle’s text, argues that Holmes’ 
solution was completely mistaken, the titular dog was 
not the instrument of crime and its owner not the 
bloodthirsty murderer divined by the detective.
Conclusions: Lessons for managers 
from Sherlock Holmes’ imaginative 
rationality
What, then, can management learn from the extended, 
narrative presentation of the pursuit of rationality and, 
in particular, from studying the account of Holmes’ 
pursuit? " e answer, as we hope to have demonstrated, 
lies in presenting its strong links with imagination. We 
have already presented Gareth Morgan’s (1993) view, 
that imagination is highly desirable for managers and 
organizational participants. For Morgan, its most 
prominent use is in creating extended metaphors 
that help one make cognitive leaps through creating 
new context for managerial problems. " is may bring 
awareness and an openness to genuine change and 
help managers to avoid the pitfalls of stereotypical 
thinking as well as extend their readiness to embrace 
responsibility. It is also an exquisite tool for learning. 
Organizations would bene# t much from a more 
extensive use of imagination. Imagination can 
also empower individuals and make them more 
intellectually courageous to deal with organizations. 
" anks to Morgan’s (1986) evocative image, we 
often picture organizations as elephants. We propose 
to imagine them as dragons – enigmatic, dangerous, 
mythical beasts that can be approached only by those 
of us who are not afraid to face them. In other words, 
imagination can, we believe, be useful for individual 
human actors, managers, participants and stakeholders 
who want to grasp the complicated patterns of 
information of the organizing processes and unveil the 
integration of what Gregory Bateson calls ecosystems 
(1979). It is thus one of the organizational “steps to 
the ecology of mind” (Bateson, 1972). 
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But imagination needs to be coupled to more 
traditional modes of sensemaking, most notably 
the rational mode of thinking espoused by the 
prevalent management discourse. " is requires a 
more nuanced understanding of rationality than the 
linear, reductionist view. " is is where we believe 
studying the conduct of Sherlock Holmes turns out 
to be particularly useful. As we hope to have shown, 
the detective’s rationality is far from straightforward 
and uni-dimensional, even though it seems to be 
preoccupied with a desire to reach reductionist ideals 
of “pure reason”. Yet Holmes’ reasoning is never pure 
in terms of its ends: it always serves to facilitate acting, 
and his method is, at heart, a pragmatic approach as 
envisioned by Peirce (1955): the detective’s knowledge 
and understanding of the world is con# ned to the 
spheres of his action: the detection (and, sometimes, 
prevention) of crime. 
Moreover, embedded as it is within the rich narrative 
of the stories, the reductionist streak of Holmesian 
rationality can be seen as the source of terror for the 
mind faced with the disenchantment of the world 
(Weber, 1963), as a comforting ritual (pronounced 
as true with utmost # nality and yet available for 
later reinterpretations and misreadings), and as a 
proposed interpretation that need not lay any claim to 
universality. As we have shown, this complex rational 
process embraces all the time a strong element of 
imagination. It is this ambivalence and complexity, 
coupled with extreme popularity that makes the 
Holmes canon a useful resource for investigating the 
role rationality plays in genres beyond the detective 
story – in our case, those of management.  Poe 
(1976), whose work spanned a dizzying array of 
genres, insisted on the importance of imagination 
for any process of inquiry, scienti# c or artistic, and 
accordingly described Dupin as a person characterized 
by “the wild fervor, and the vivid freshness of his 
imagination” (Poe, 1982, p. 143). Similarly, the more 
incisive studies of managerial competence, while often 
retaining the commitment to rationality, do not hail 
it as the solution to all problems and certainly tend to 
describe it as a complex process.
" e dark side of Holmesian rationality drives the hero 
to the use of narcotics and so often makes him waver 
on the brink of depression. " is makes yet another 
proof that Holmes’ mind in non-linear: what is 
unidimensional does not cast a shadow. Indeed, the dark 
tendencies we # nd in Holmes, are the consequences 
of a vivid imagination, supporting reductionist 
reasoning processes: the need for complication, 
making unexpected connections, the relentless quest 
for intellectual stimulation. We propose Holmes, an 
admirable and heroic # gure undercut by reductionist 
views and destructive impulses as an exemplar of the 
promise as well as the threat of rational management 
and of extending rationality with imagination, both 
as a re% ection of the ongoing debates and as an 
inspiration for further inquiries. 
Holmes thus embodies, in our argument, the joining 
of the rational and the imaginative, complete with 
paradoxes and inconsistencies embedded in both 
ideas. " e product of this union, what we call here 
the extended Holmesian rationality, can be seen 
as a powerful, creative and constructive way of 
organizational thinking, in line with Bateson’s (1972; 
1979) ideas about the ecology of mind. Bateson 
argued that contemporary philosophy is concentrated 
on purpose and means. " is way of conceiving of 
the world, which we recognize in the reductionist 
managerialist theories and models, many of which 
are in use up to this date, contributes to the creating 
and upholding of an unbalanced system in society 
as in nature. Reductionist thinking creates a urge 
to control, and an illusion that it can be ful# lled. 
Management becomes an autocratic rule aimed at 
changing the organization and the environment to 
# t to the plans and predetermined aims. " is puts 
the ecosystem, broadly understood to include both 
nature and human culture, out of balance and makes 
dependency and competition the only working 
regulators. However, there are many natural % ows 
and regulators within the system that could be used 
to manage in accord with them. Instead of forcing the 
actors and resources to cooperate, a management more 
aware of the complexities of the ecosystem could use 
what is already present in the system. " e system does 
not work in a linear way and to control it, one needs 
humility, based on the recognition that consciousness 
and reason alone cannot provide all the answers. A 
unity of reason, traditional managerial rationality and 
imagination – or what we call extended Holmesian 
rationality can provide what Bateson (1972) saw as 
complete knowledge needed for the management of 
complex organizations. As the example of Holmes 
shows, this rationality is not devoid of its % aws and 
shadows, but we do not believe in a shadowless world 
13Sherlock Holmes and the Adventure of the Rational Manager: Organizational reason and its discontents
! is copy does not follow journal layout or page numbers. Originally published in Scandinavian Journal of Management
under the sun. 
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